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Introduction
In the continuing debate over the genre of Tolkien’s writings, 
the appreciation of his life and work as a whole, and his 
relationship to the other Inklings, the term “Romanticism” 
has enjoyed some currency. In characterizing Tolkien in this 
way, recourse has often been made to the now well-trodden 
essay “On Fairy-Stories”. The invocation of such concepts as 
sub-creation, secondary belief, and eucatastrophe have 
inevitably led to comparisons of Tolkien’s views on artistic 
creation with the traditional conventions of Romantic 
thought: in particular, with those of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge. But while a handful of commentators have 
explored these connections in some depth, as yet no one (to 
my knowledge) has advanced a clear or convincing analysis 
of Tolkien’s place within the Romantic tradition. No one, for 
example, has addressed ii a straightforward manner the 
question of whether Tolkien has made any significant 
contribution to Romantic thought, or if his views are merely 
idiosyncratic. Many have carefully taken note of Tolkien’s 
apparent disagreements with Coleridge, but few (it seems) 
have given much thought to what those discrepancies might 
mean as part of a larger picture.
My purpose here is to explore the use of Romanticism as a 
way of characterizing Tolkien’s self-understanding in the 
context of Romanticism. Specifically, I want to examine 
more closely his relationship to Coleridge’s views in order to 
clarify what makes Tolkien’s understanding of fantasy 
distinctive within the tradition of Romantic thought. Central 
to my evaluation is the conclusion that sub-creation (surely 
Tolkien’s most celebrated expression) is not, in fact, the most 
crucial facet of his theory of the fairy story. Instead, what 
emerges as the most distinctive feature of his aesthetic is the 
restriction'of sub-creation to the narrative mode, and the 
exclusion of the visual as a vehicle of authentic fantasy. My
argument, simply put, is that Tolkien’s seemingly minor 
disputes with Coleridge in reality form the necessary basis 
for his claim that drama -  and indeed all visual modes of art 
-  are essentially hostile to fantasy (Tolkien, 1989a, pp. 47- 
48).
The absoluteness of Tolkien’s position demands 
explanation — not only in its own right but because, unlike 
the concept of sub-creation itself (which enjoys a central 
place in Romantic thought), its restriction to narrative stands 
out as an anomaly1. I offer that Tolkien is being neither 
facetious nor idiosyncratic in his rejection of these artistic 
modes. Accordingly, the logic of this rejection is to be 
deduced from the differing concerns which narrative and the 
visual signify for him. To summarize briefly my argument, 
Tolkien revises the Romantic tradition by asserting the 
validity of fantasy as a distinct mode of art. He differentiates 
fantasy from other art forms by restricting it to narrative, 
thereby highlighting its non-visual or non-representational 
character. For Tolkien, non-visual art implies:
1) a particular relationship between the artist and the 
hearer, which demands an active use of the imagination from 
the latter,
2) an ambivalence within the human desire to realize 
fantasy in the primary world, hindered by the Fall but 
anticipating the evangelium, and
3) the ongoing role of humanity as sub-creator, embodied 
in the continual recovery of authentic vision through fantasy.
Ultimately, this will lead us beyond the Romantic tradition 
to Tolkien’s deeply-held religious convictions. In the last 
analysis, it is the contours of Tolkien’s theology which 
account for the shape of his Romanticism. None of this 
should be surprising to anyone acquainted with Tolkien’s 
writings, but for the most part this understanding has been 
applied only to the more obvious aspects of “On Fairy-
1 Since its beginnings in the eighteenth-century, Romanticism has freely included both the dramatic and the visual within its aesthetic 
canon. For examples of this, see Engell, 1981.
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Stories”; and since these suggest continuity with the tenets of 
Romantic thought, they tend to neglect this crucial revision.
Tolkien, Coleridge, and the Romantic 
Tradition
Attempts to identify possible Romantic links to Tolkien’s 
thought have focused either upon the essay or upon his 
relationships with the other Inklings; in particular, with 
Owen Barfield. This latter possibility has most recently been 
advocated by Gareth Knight, whose introduction to the 
writings of the Inklings posits Barfield as a common 
denominator connecting the work of Tolkien, Lewis and 
Williams to a more or less explicit Coleridgian hermeneutic: 
It is in the psychological and philosophical thought 
of Coleridge, on the subject of the imagination, that the 
secret of the power of the creative work of the other 
Inklings is to be found . . . This was less a conscious 
following after Coleridge than a deliberate choice to 
cultivate the “mythopoeic” in their writing . . . Their 
common purpose had its roots in a unity of spiritual 
intention or compatibility . . . Barfield, through his 
intellectual influence, both orally and as expressed in 
Poetic Diction provided an intellectual stimulus to much 
of this.
(Knight, 1990, pp. 10, 11, 13-14)
In his analysis of the nature and extent of the Inklings’ 
association, Humphrey Carpenter has made reference to 
Poetic Diction as expressive of Barfield’s views on language, 
and confirms that Tolkien had indeed read and approved of 
the book (Carpenter, 1979, p. 42). Carpenter is quick to 
remind us, however, of the major differences in Tolkien and 
Barfield’s religious outlooks and how those differences do 
have a significant impact on their respective understandings 
of myth (Carpenter, 1979, pp. 153-157). The mere fact of 
Barfield’s discipleship to Coleridge may, therefore, not be 
sufficient warrant for Knight’s view of Barfield as the 
principal mediator of the Romantic tradition to Tolkien. As 
an heuristic convenience, Coleridge’s thought may be a 
useful lens for highlighting and accounting for some of the 
commonalities of the Inklings as a group; but his views can 
neither explain -  nor explain away -  the differences in the 
self-understandings of Tolkien, Lewis, Williams, and 
Barfield. Nor does the invocation of Coleridge alone provide 
an adequate framework for assessing the relative significance 
of those differences.2
There are no explicit references to Coleridge by name in 
“On Fairy-Stories”.3 Commentators on the essay have 
pointed out at least two passages where they believe Tolkien 
to have been consciously engaging Coleridge’s views:
1) Tolkien’s objection to the phrase “willing suspension of 
disbelief’4 as an accurate description of the subjectivity
induced by an effective narrative (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 36), and
2) Tolkien’s redefinition of “fantasy” in relation to what 
he calls the technical use of the term “imagination” (Tolkien, 
1989a, pp. 44ff). What follows is a brief survey of the 
remarks and observations which have been made on these 
possible connections to Coleridge’s thought.
Considering Tolkien’s substitution of his own expression 
“secondary belief’ (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 37) for Coleridge’s 
willing suspension of disbelief, Randel Helms (1974, pp. 11, 
77-78), Frank Bergmann (1977, p. 13), and Henry Parks 
(1981, p. 142) argue that Tolkien is here strengthening 
Coleridge’s words by giving them an affirmative rather than 
a negative sense, or by shifting attention from the passive 
acceptance of the reader to the active role of the author. Ann 
Swinfen concurs with this view (Swinfen, 1984, p. 7), but 
suggests that it points to a much deeper philosophical gap 
between the two writers:
Coleridge evolved his theory of imagination in reaction 
to the associationist theories of Locke and Hartley, but 
despite his reading of neo-Platonists like Cudworth or 
such earlier writers as Plotinus and Proclus, he never 
fully subscribed to the Platonic view that the primary 
world is a world of shadows cast by ideal realities. 
Tolkien can be seen as essentially a Christian Neo- 
Platonist . . . while Tolkien probably took the term 
“secondary” from Coleridge, Tolkien’s sub-creative art 
which creates secondary worlds is also capable of 
affording glimpses of joy and eternal truth. Coleridge 
did not feel that imagination could grasp truths which 
were beyond the scope of reason, although he believed 
that religious faith might do so.
(Swinfen, 1984, pp. 8-9)
A dissenting voice to the view that more than mere 
terminology is at stake is that of Jan Wojcik, who downplays 
the significance of this semantic distinction in order to affirm 
that Tolkien and Coleridge are in basic agreement as to “the 
functioning of the imagination in art, the nature of the artistic 
product, and the motives behind creation” (Wojcik, 1968, p. 
134).
Regardless of how one views this matter, it is important to 
note that (subsidiary to his main thesis) Wojcik commits a 
significant error in his reading of Tolkien. In his framing of 
the issue of secondary belief and the willing suspension of 
disbelief, Wojcik claims that Tolkien “labors over words 
rather than meaning” (Wojcik, 1968, p. 137); for, he reasons, 
if these two expressions were to be taken literally, it would 
imply that Tolkien was arguing “as if there were an 
ontological difference in the kind of art inducing each state” 
(Wojcik, 1968, p. 136). Wojcik is absolutely correct in his 
reasoning on this point; what seems to escape him is the fact 
that this is exactly what Tolkien is arguing.
2 This difficulty is compounded by Knight’s own conflicting motivations for invoking Coleridge. On the one hand, he wants simply to 
highlight the similarities of the Inklings from a particular angle; on the other hand, he sees their differences as divisive to his attempt to 
“rescue” them from the appropriation of their writings in the cause of religious “orthodoxy”. Knight’s usage of Coleridge’s ideas thus serves 
as a normative (rather than a merely heuristic) counter-framework of interpretation.
3 By contrast, Tolkien does make explicit reference to George MacDonald and to G.K. Chesterton. For a useful analysis of the similarities 
between Tolkien’s and MacDonald’s views of faiiy story, see Bergmann’s 1977 article.
4 Used by Coleridge in Chapter XIV of the Biographia Literaria, 1907.
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My own view is that Tolkien’s decision to take issue with 
Coleridge’s expression is both conscious and intentional. 
Tolkien, it must be remembered, is speaking not of artistic 
creation in general but of a particular mode of art as distinct 
from others. Hence, Tolkien is not seeking to replace 
Coleridge’s critical vocabulary as generally applicable to 
certain kinds of aesthetic experience; rather, he is asserting 
that there is a radical difference between the fairy story mode 
and all others. For so complete a distinction as Tolkien is 
attempting, a precise and substantive difference in 
terminology is called for.
Both secondary belief and the willing suspension of 
disbelief concern the reception of art; this, however, is 
ancillary to Tolkien’s and Coleridge’s differences regarding 
the nature and purpose of artistic creation itself. It is here 
that the true extent of Tolkien’s revision of Romantic thought 
becomes apparent. In the essay, Tolkien identifies the fairy 
story mode with the term “fantasy” (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 45). 
This he does in reaction to what he characterizes as a 
misapplication of the meaning -  “in technical not normal 
language” (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 44) -  of the term 
“imagination”. Tolkien is here striking for the very heart of 
the Romantic tradition -  that is to say, the role and status of 
the creative imagination. But while the terms “fancy” -  
which Tolkien views as “a reduced and depreciatory form of 
the older word Fantasy” (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 45) -  and 
“imagination” play a central role in Coleridge’s aesthetic 
thought, he did not invent them; nor is Tolkien, for that 
matter, justified in asserting their distinction to be one of 
“technical use” only:
Coleridge’s famous distinction between “fancy” and 
“imagination” used to be thought either to have 
originated with him or to have had an obscure German 
source. But actually a growing distinction between the 
terms took place in English usage throughout the 
eighteenth century, and in much the same direction in 
which Coleridge developed or ramified it.
(Engell, 1981, p. 172)
Before reviewing the commentators on Tolkien’s usage of 
these two terms, therefore, some background is needed to 
appreciate fully the weight of associations bound up with this 
pair. The term “imagination”
had not, by 1700, become connotative in a broad sense. 
It meant a fairly limited power connected, in the main, 
with the simple formation of images . . .  By the 1720s 
and 1730s the imagination begins to acquire a distinctly 
positive character. It becomes the power not only to 
invent images but also to animate and excite, providing 
what Dryden called the “life-touches” and “secret 
graces” of art . . . i t  acquired a moral, aesthetic, and 
even religious value that was almost exclusively 
positive . . . As' the idea evolved . . .  it became a 
vital principle for an expanding network of concepts 
and values. The understanding of genius, poetic power, 
and originality, of sympathy, individuality, knowledge, 
and even of ethics grew and took lifeblood from the 
idea of the imagination.
(Engell, 1981, pp. 34,41,47)
75
This, in brief, is the background within which Tolkien is 
working in “On Fairy-Stories.”
But it is also necessary to explain why the uses of fancy 
and imagination underwent the transformations that they did: 
we must ask why these more or less synonymous ideas 
became distinguished in the first place, why people came to 
insist on maintaining the distinction and, finally, why 
Tolkien found it necessary to revise it. James Engell, in his 
historical survey of Romanticism, remarks that Thomas 
Hobbes was apparently the last major writer to speak of 
fantasy or fancy in the non-depreciative sense:
As this distinction developed, it involved a reversal 
of the traditional distinction between the two terms. 
Coming from the Greek, phantasia carried with it the 
suggestion of creativity and play of mind, with the 
possible implication of license and illusion as a by­
product of that freedom. The Latin imaginatio, on the 
contrary, had a block-like, Roman solidity derived from 
the primary word “image,” which referred to a mental 
concept as much as a visual “image”. It was akin to the 
word “imitation” and carried with it a sense of fidelity 
and accuracy. But precisely because phantasia 
suggested a greater freedom of mind, whether for 
creative insight, for perception, or for illusion, the word 
“fancy” began to bear the brunt of suspicion or distrust 
thrown by seventeenth century rationalism and, above 
all, by the fashionable colloquial speech that echoed it 
. . .  In the search for a new or different word to 
express what . . . rationalism seemed to leave out, the 
more solid word “imagination,” with its implication of 
being firmly rooted in the concrete, was at hand.
(Engell, 1981, p. 173)
The usage of phantasia and imaginatio, then, begins to shift 
as these ideas become caught up in other distinctions and 
concerns.
Tolkien’s first move in “On Fairy-Stories” is to restrict the 
meaning of imagination to its pre-Romantic sense as the 
mental faculty of forming images of objects no longer 
present to the senses (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 44). In this he 
agrees with Hobbes’ view of imagination as “decaying 
sense” (Engell, 1981, p. 14). It is also notable that many 
Romantic definitions of fancy agree with Tolkien’s 
characterisation of the image-making faculty. What Tolkien 
has done, then, is to return imagination from its enlarged 
meaning and to recover its literal sense. “In the new 
hierarchy of terms,” observes Wojcik,
Imagination would occupy its previous position in the 
Thomistic system which describes it as the image 
making function, and a new word, Fantasy (a word that 
Thomas held to be synonymous with imagination), 
would be the term which described [what Coleridge 
called] the “secondary” or “intellectualized” 
imagination.
(Wojcik, 1968, p. 135)
But why was it necessary to invent a categorical distinction 
where no such distinction had previously existed?
Tolkien’s quarrel over the kind of “belief’ induced by sub- 
creation already hints at a solution to this problem. What
seems to be at stake is the truth value of art in its various 
forms, particularly those forms which do not merely seek to 
“reproduce” or “imitate” empirical reality. This concern, in 
turn, addresses the question of the value and validity of art, 
which for Romantic thought comes to be signified by the 
image of the artistic process as analogous to God’s creative 
activity. While this vision of humanity as “sub-creative” has 
many precedents in both Classical and Renaissance thought 
(Engell, 1981, pp. 44, 50), it is only with the Romanticism of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that it becomes 
wholly identified with the term “imagination” (Engell, 1981, 
p. 138). The inevitable semantic consequence of this 
amplification of meaning, as Tolkien himself observed 
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 44), is that “imagination” must now stand 
for more than one thing; that is, both its literal meaning as 
the image-making faculty and its broader designation for the 
creative process as a whole. In assessing Tolkien's remarks 
on this point, then, it will be helpful to consider whether his 
views about fantasy are best characterized as being Romantic 
or Classical.
Tolkien’s attempt at recovering a Classical (or Thomistic) 
sense of imagination is clear enough; but his treatment of 
fantasy is rather more nuanced and does not fit neatly into 
either category. Robert Reilly characterizes Tolkien as 
“elaborating” and “slightly qualifying” the Romantic view 
(1971, pp. 203-204). With respect to Coleridge, he sees 
Tolkien to be “defending,” “reviving,” and “making explicit 
and Christian Coleridge’s claim for the worth of the creative 
imagination” (Reilly, 1971, pp. 205, 210). Swinfen, on the 
other hand, once more emphasizing philosophical differences 
as the root of their semantic manoeuvring, sees Tolkien “to 
all intents and purposes” as consciously reversing 
Coleridge’s position (Swinfen, 1984, p. 8). Wojcik, viewing 
Tolkien’s apparent disagreements as red herrings, asserts that 
he is fundamentally in agreement with Coleridge (Wojcik, 
1968, p. 134).
One reason for the wide divergence in judgement over this 
point is certainly the differing interests and concerns each 
commentator is addressing; yet just as central to their 
disagreement is a shared failure to identify the different 
concerns which Tolkien himself is addressing in his 
definition of fantasy as a distinct artistic mode. This failure 
to clarify his remarks leads Reilly to make a confusing and 
partially erroneous statement which Wojcik fails to correct in 
his own critique of Reilly’s argument. In his book Romantic 
Religion, Reilly states that Coleridge “thought of the two 
capacities [that is, fancy and imagination] as wholly distinct 
faculties”. “Tolkien,” he then goes on to claim, “would re­
combine them because he believes ‘the verbal distinction 
philologically inappropriate, and the analysis inaccurate’” 
(Reilly, 1971, p. 204). Wojcik, accepting Reilly’s 
characterisation of Tolkien’s position, suggests that 
“Coleridge would combine them also; and Tolkien is closer 
to Coleridge in his thinking than either he or Reilly think” 
(Wojcik, 1968, p. 135).
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Wojcik and Reilly’s confusion derives from their 
conflation of two connected statements made by Tolkien 
which seem to be identical, but are in fact distinct in 
meaning. I quote these here in full:
[ 1 ] For my present purpose I require a word which 
shall embrace both the Sub-creative Art in itself and a 
quality of strangeness and wonder in the Expression, 
derived from the Image: a quality essential to fairy- 
story.
[2] I propose, therefore, to arrogate to myself the 
powers of Humpty-Dumpty, and to use Fantasy for this 
purpose: in a sense, that is, which combines with its 
older and higher use as an equivalent of Imagination the 
derived notions of “unreality” (that is, of unlikeness to 
the Primary World), of freedom from the domination of 
observed “fact”, in short of the fantastic.
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 45, my emphasis)
If Tolkien does indeed speak of fantasy as “combining,” he 
also speaks of it as “embracing”. Beyond the obvious 
difference in the meaning of these two words, it must be 
noted that Tolkien is here using their nuance to clarify two 
separate aspects of his definition of fantasy. When he uses 
the expression “combining,” Tolkien is referring to the 
senses of meaning which he intends the word itself to evoke 
(as over against its conventional, depreciative sense). By 
contrast, when Tolkien speaks of fantasy as “embracing” he 
refers not to the semantic associations of the word, but rather 
to its referent, which is for him both the artistic process itself 
and the finished product.
What needs to be emphasized here is that Reilly is 
incorrect when he claims that Tolkien is combining the 
Coleridgian faculties of fancy and imagination. On the 
contrary, Tolkien insists that the two be categorically 
separated, “imagination” being restricted to its descriptive 
meaning as image-making, and “fantasy” elevated to replace 
the Romantic faculty of the creative imagination. In 
preserving this categorical distinction between fantasy and 
imagination, then, Tolkien is best characterized as Romantic 
rather than Classical. But Swinfen, too, is not wholly 
accurate in her claim that Tolkien simply “reverses” the 
terms of the distinction, for as we have already shown, 
Tolkien is not defining fantasy as a general mental faculty 
but as a distinct mode of art. In this, perhaps, he is unique to 
the Romantic tradition.
This cohabitation of both Romantic and Classical elements 
in Tolkien’s definition is also perceptible in the double sense 
which he attaches to the word “fantasy”. In Tolkien’s own 
words, he wishes the term to resonate with both “its older 
and higher use as an equivalent of Imagination” -  that is, the 
Thomistic sense described by Wojcik -  and “the derived 
notions of ‘unreality’ . . .  of freedom from the domination 
of observed fact . . .  of the fantastic” (in other words, its 
“depreciative” Romantic sense)5. “But while admitting that,” 
he continues, “I do not assent to the depreciative tone. That 
the images are of things not in the primary world (if that
E N A R Y  C O N F E R E N C E
5 I take the Romantic-Classical model from Alex Lewis, whose article on the interplay of these elements in Tolkien’s own fiction concurs 
that Tolkien cannot be fit into either category (narrowly understood). See especially Lewis, 1988, p. 11.
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indeed is possible) is a virtue not a vice. Fantasy (in this 
sense) is, I think, not a lower but a higher form of Art, 
indeed the most nearly pure form, and so (when achieved) 
the most potent” (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 45). With these words it 
becomes clear that Tolkien is not (as Reilly would 
characterize him) only “slightly qualifying” Romantic 
conventions; he is in fact overhauling the entire framework 
of Romantic sensibilities by privileging fantasy as the very 
paradigm of all art. The keynote of Tolkien’s revisionist 
view pivots on his refusal to assent to the depreciative usage 
of “fantasy,” the origins of which we now turn to in more 
detail.
Behind the diminution of phantasia into fancy “lies the 
eighteenth-century tradition of empirical psychology” 
(Engell, 1981, p. 130). John Locke’s famous distinction 
between simple and complex ideas generated reflection on 
the active and passive dimensions of human perception, 
ascribing to the mind both “productive” and “reproductive” 
powers (Engell, 1981, pp. 18, 20). It is into this cluster of 
related distinctions that the heretofore synonymous terms 
“fancy” and “imagination” were cast.
As with the Classical sense of imaginatio, the mind was 
capable of reproducing sense impressions as they were 
received from the empirical world. In addition to this, the 
mind could also actively alter, rearrange, and connect these 
impressions in a conscious, purposeful and productive way. 
The eighteenth-century expression for this latter power was 
“association,” and the framework of associationist 
psychology was soon adopted into the critical vocabulary of 
Romantic aesthetics as a principle of artistic creation.
But not without modifications. From the preceding 
psychological distinction between the “reproduction” of 
images and their “productive” association, we might expect 
phantasia to designate the latter faculty as a positive 
foundation for the artistic process; but in fact what takes 
place is a further Romantic fracturing of the associative 
principle into a greater and a lesser degree, “almost every 
discussion of the imagination during the last third of the 
century,” writes Engell:
contains either a direct or an implied distinction 
between “fancy” and “imagination”. Although there is 
no clear-cut correspondence in all these distinctions, at 
least one generalization can be made. Most of them 
assume fancy . . . to be mainly an associative power 
that supplies the mind or the inner eye with numerous 
images . . . But the imagination fuses, combines, 
transforms, and orders images so that they produce an 
artistic or aesthetic unity.
(Engell, 1981, p. 176)
A three-fold understanding of perception as it pertains to 
art thus develops in Romantic thought. This may be 
summarized as a distinction between memory (the simple 
reproduction of sense-impressions, coextensive with human 
consciousness), fancy (the associative faculty of productively 
combining and rearranging sense-impressions), and 
imagination (the power of transforming these associations 
into art). There were several reasons for introducing this 
tripartite distinction, and a consideration of why fancy was
systematically excluded from the fold of genuine art will aid 
us in understanding Tolkien’s motives for altering its 
conventional meaning.
Tolkien himself speaks of fancy as the “enchanter’s 
power” and views the association of ideas in terms of the 
“the powers of generalisation and abstraction”:
The human mind . . . sees not only green-grass, 
discriminating it from other things (and finding it fair to 
look upon), but sees that it is green as well as being 
grass. But how powerful, how stimulating to the very 
faculty that produced it, was the invention of the 
adjective: no spell or incantation in Faerie is more 
potent. And that is not surprising: such incantations 
might indeed be said to be only another view of 
adjectives, a part of speech in a mythical grammar. The 
mind that thought of light, heavy, grey, yellow, still, 
swift, also conceived of magic that would make heavy 
things light and able to fly, turn grey lead into yellow 
gold, and the still rock into swift water. If it could do 
the one, it could do the other; it inevitably did both. 
When we can take green from grass, blue from heaven, 
and red from blood, we have already an enchanter’s 
power — upon one plane; and the desire to wield that 
power in the world external to our minds awakes. It 
does not follow that we shall use that power well up on 
any plane . . . But in such “fantasy”, as it is called, 
new form is made; Faerie begins; Man becomes a sub­
creator.
(Tolkien, 1989a, pp. 24-25)
But Tolkien, too, sees association as a lesser or subsidiary 
power, and so distinguishes it with his definition of 
imagination:
The mental power of image-making is one thing, or 
aspect; and it should appropriately be called 
Imagination. The perception of the image, the grasp of 
its implications, and the control, which are necessary to 
a successful expression, may vary in vividness and 
strength: but this is a difference of degree in 
Imagination, not a difference in kind. The achievement 
of the expression, which gives (or seems to give) “the 
inner consistency of reality” (That is: which commands 
or induces Secondary Belief.), is indeed another thing, 
or aspect, needing another name: Art, the operative link 
between Imagination and the final result, Sub-creation. 
(Tolkien, 1989a, pp. 44-45)
Again, it must be recalled that while the sense of Tolkien’s 
term “fantasy” combines both the Classical definition of 
imaginatio with the associative, Romantic definition of fancy, 
what it embraces are not the faculties of phantasia and 
imaginatio, but rather two moments in the aesthetic act. This 
is perhaps best exemplified in “Leaf by Niggle”, where 
Tolkien’s artist, looking upon his realized art, calls it a gift: 
“He was referring to his art, and also to the result', but he was 
using the word quite literally” (Tolkien, 1989b, p. 88, my 
emphasis). For Tolkien, then, “the result” includes both the 
artefact itself and the act of beholding it.
Why Tolkien makes this distinction between the sense and 
referent of the word will be explored later; what is important
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to note at present is that Tolkien is in fundamental agreement 
with the Romantic tradition as to the general character of 
association and its subsidiary status within the artistic 
process as a whole. Disagreement emerges only over the 
issue of where “fantasy” belongs within this framework. The 
tradition simply equates it with association, and so restricts 
it; Tolkien acknowledges its associative dimension, but then 
asserts that this is “a virtue not a vice". More specifically, 
there are two aspects of Tolkien’s definition of fantasy which 
Romantic thought denies to associative fancy. These arc 1) 
its inability to achieve aesthetic unity (“the inner consistency 
of reality”), and 2) its lack of connection to reality (its truth 
value).
These two aspects are in fact quite closely related. By 
definition it would be impossible for something without any 
relationship to reality whatsoever to be possessed of the 
“inner consistency” of the latter. Moreover, the lack of any 
reality-referent can also signify a lack of purpose, which in 
turn could make the goal of aesthetic unity unrealisable. 
Tolkien, of course, argues against such a view of fantasy. 
“Fantasy,” he says, “is a rational not an irrational activity” 
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 45). If it is indeed “rational” -  that is, 
motivated and controlled by the faculty of reason -  then it 
must involve (for Tolkien) both conscious will and purpose. 
At some level, it must also engage reason, as expressed by 
the question: “Is it true?” (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 36).
Because one of the effects of successful fantasy is its 
inducement of a kind of subjectivity distinct from that 
produced by our perception of empirical reality -  that is, of 
an affirming “secondary belief’ -  Tolkien must defend his 
assertion of the rationality of fantasy on two levels. The first 
of these concerns us with Tolkien’s disagreement with the 
Romantic tradition over the relation between fantasy and the 
associative faculty; the second moves us finally to Tolkien’s 
novel claim that narrative alone is the only proper mode of 
the fantastic. These two levels cannot be understood 
independently, for they rely upon one another for their 
coherence — if Tolkien had accepted the associative 
definition of fantasy, his subsequent restriction of fantasy to 
narrative would have been quite unnecessary. Before moving 
on to our evaluation of the significance of narrative for 
Tolkien, then, we must dwell for a little longer on Tolkien’s 
response to the “depreciation” of fantasy by Romantic 
thought.
One of the limitations ascribed to fancy as association is 
that it is “mechanistic,” and thus incapable of aesthetic unity. 
“This association can be spontaneous or willed, ordered or 
random, yet it is ‘mechanical’ because the images associated 
are not transformed; they appear in the bits and pieces in 
which they were first experienced” (Engell, 1981, p. 179). 
One of the limitations to such fancy is its apparent 
arbitrariness -  the parading of its artifice of dissonant images 
which appear to lack any natural relationship to each other. 
Tolkien recognises this problem, but sees it as distinct from 
the issue of secondary belief:
Fantasy has . . .  an essential drawback: it is 
difficult to achieve. Fantasy may be, as I think, not less 
but more sub-creative; but at any rate it is found in
practice that “the inner consistency of reality” is more 
difficult to produce, the more unlike are the images and 
the rearrangements of primary material to the actual 
arrangements of the Primary World. It is easier to 
produce this kind of “reality” with more “sober" 
material. Fantasy thus, too often, remains undeveloped; 
it is and has been used frivolously, or only half- 
seriously, or merely for decoration: it remains merely 
“fanciful”. Anyone inheriting the fantastic device of 
human language can say the green sun. Many can then 
imagine or picture it. But that is not enough -  though it 
may already be a more potent thing than many a 
“thumbnail sketch” or “transcript of life” that receives 
literary praise.
To make a Secondary World inside which the green 
sun will be credible, commanding Secondary Belief, 
will probably require labour and thought, and will 
certainly demand a special skill.
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 46)
But here again Tolkien is simply arguing over whether the 
term “fantasy” ought to designate both association and the 
achievement of aesthetic unity.
Where he really comes into conflict with Romantic 
sensibilities is when he debunks the notion that the primary 
world is the only criterion from which to judge the aesthetic 
value of patently imaginative creations. For many Romantic 
thinkers, fantastic associations are merely fanciful because 
their existence is impossible in the primary world (Engell, 
1981, p. 120). For Tolkien, by contrast:
Fairy-stories were plainly not primarily concerned 
with possibility, but with desirability. If they awakened 
desire, satisfying it while often whetting it unbearably, 
they succeeded . . . Fantasy is made out of the 
Primary World, but a good craftsman loves his 
material, and has a knowledge and feeling for clay, 
stone and wood which only the art of making can give. 
By the forging of Gram, cold iron was revealed; by the 
making of Pegasus horses were ennobled; in the Trees 
of the Sun and Moon root and stock, flower and fruit 
are manifested in glory.
(Tolkien, 1989a, pp. 39, 54-55).
Tolkien’s vocabulary of “revealing,” “ennobling,” and 
“manifesting” clearly evokes the Romantic sense that human 
imagination is ultimately creative as God is creative. For 
Tolkien, then, purely fantastic creations (like the Pegasus) do 
constitute an aesthetic unity because the human desire from 
which they arise is natural rather than contrived. Their truth 
value rests not in their fidelity to the primary world but in 
their capacity to signify desire. This argument, however, 
simply transfers the question of validity from the signifier to 
the signified, and so Tolkien’s defence of fantasy must 
ultimately be a defence of the legitimacy of human desire. It 
is this which leads Tolkien from the Romantic philosophy of 
art to his own convictions about humanity as a Catholic 
Christian. In this, his theory of fantasy undergoes significant 
departures from Romantic thought; and it is to these 
departures which we now turn.
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Drama and Narrative
For Tolkien, fantasy is a thing “best left to words, to true 
literature”:
It is a misfortune that Drama, an art fundamentally 
distinct from Literature, should so commonly be 
considered together with it, or as a branch of it. Among 
these misfortunes we may reckon the depreciation of 
Fantasy. For in part at least this depreciation is due to 
the natural desire of critics to cry up the forms of 
literature or “imagination” that they themselves, 
innately or by training, prefer. And criticism in a 
country that has produced so great a Drama, and 
possesses the works of William Shakespeare, tends to 
be far too dramatic. But Drama is naturally hostile to 
Fantasy. Fantasy, even of the simplest kind, hardly ever 
succeeds in Drama, when that is presented as it should 
be, visibly and audibly acted.
(Tolkien, 1989a, pp. 46-47)
To some, Tolkien’s judgement may appear unnecessarily 
polemical, particularly when one recalls the intensely 
“dramatic” character of much of his own creative writing6, 
and perhaps it is for this reason that less attention has been 
paid to this aspect of “On Fairy-Stories”. But Tolkien’s 
emphasis on the “hostility” of drama to fantasy, as I have 
been insisting and will now demonstrate, is an integral 
element to what makes him distinctive in the context of 
Romanticism.
Tolkien has basically two qualms about drama’s attempting 
to be a medium of fantasy: 1) it necessarily relies on visual 
representation, and 2) it is necessarily anthropocentric in 
both its form and content. Beginning with the first problem, I 
will show that Tolkien’s two revisions of the Romantic 
tradition already discussed -  that is, his preference for the 
expression “secondary belief’ over Coleridge’s willing 
suspension of disbelief, and his refusal to restrict the 
meaning of “fantasy” to its depreciatory sense as a 
mechanical, associative faculty -  are identical in spirit and 
motive to his polemic against drama. Interestingly, we will 
find that Tolkien’s criticism of the limitations of drama in 
many ways resonates with the conventional Romantic view 
of “fancy” as a lesser form of imagination.
A principal defect in dramatic attempts at achieving the 
fantastic, in Tolkien’s view, is that: “the producers of drama 
have to, or try to, work with mechanism to represent either 
Fantasy or Magic” (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 47). If fantasy is 
difficult to achieve through words, how much more difficult 
is it to effect before the naked eye? These are good grounds 
for disqualifying drama in Tolkien’s view since, for him, 
fantasy must be capable of producing secondary belief. 
Because drama is rarely able to conceal its own artifice it 
can, like Romantic fancy, hope to achieve little more than a 
willing suspension of disbelief.
If Tolkien’s criticism were directed merely against this 
technical ineptitude of mechanism for producing visual 
fantasy, we might hold some doubts as to its continuing 
validity: for today, over half a century after the essay was 
written, we do possess a cinematic art (certainly both visual 
and dramatic) with the power of giving the inner consistency 
of reality to fantastic images with great facility. But 
Tolkien’s reasoning is, in fact, much more comprehensive:
A reason, more important, I think, than the 
inadequacy of stage-effects, is this: Drama has, of its 
very nature, already attempted a kind of bogus, or shall 
I say at least substitute, magic: the visible and audible 
presentation o f imaginary men in a story. That is in itself 
an attempt to counterfeit the magician’s wand. To 
introduce, even with mechanical success, into this 
quasi-magical secondary world a further fantasy or 
magic is to demand, as it were, an inner or tertiary 
world. It is a world too much. To make such a thing 
may not be impossible. I have never seen it done with 
success. But at least it cannot be claimed as the proper 
mode of drama . . . For this precise reason — that the 
characters, and even the scenes, are in Drama not 
imagined but actually beheld — Drama is . . . an art 
fundamentally different from narrative art.
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 48)
With drama the eye of the beholder must inevitably be 
focused upon the human condition -  it is human beings who 
make up the primary content of dramatic performance. 
“Very little about trees as trees can be got into a play” 
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 48). Moreover, Tolkien’s claim that 
drama’s difference from narrative lies in the fact of its being 
beheld rather than imagined is surely linked to literature’s 
capacity to circumvent the dramatic focus on the humane.
In other words, it seems that we have here stumbled upon 
the beginnings of an understanding of the motive behind 
Tolkien’s definition of fantasy as narrative art embracing 
both the act of artistic creation itself and the experience of 
the finished product. The principal content of fantasy or the 
fairy story (that is to say, the absence of a limited dramatic 
focus on the human condition as such) is somehow related in 
Tolkien’s mind to the form in which the finished product is 
experienced (that is, through the exercise of the imaginative 
faculty rather then being “beheld” by the human eye). These 
two aspects of Tolkien’s aesthetic (the non-anthropocentric 
and the non-visual) ultimately join forces to lay the 
foundation for his vision of fantasy as a narrative of alterity -  
of otherness, of transcendence. Taken together, these three 
dimensions of the visual form the mediating link between 
Tolkien’s terminological disputes with Coleridge and his 
unique theology of the eucatastrophe as the highest function 
of fantasy. We examine each of these dimensions in turn.
T H E  R O M A N T I C  T R A D I T I O N
6 The “drama” of Tolkien’s writing lies as much in the aurality of reading and hearing it as it does in the narrated story itself. In this respect, 
John Ellison observes that Tolkien’s sub-creation “is a world of sound as much as it is a world of sense and specific meaning. Sound, that is, 
expressed not only through the medium of his languages, real and invented, but also in the wealth of sound images in the text, with all their 
consequentially evoked sensations of light and darkness, colour and space. This is the dimension of reality that Tolkien found to be lacking 
in spoken drama . . . LotR plays itself out as an immense drama against a scenic panorama which each reader creates and paints in his or 
her own mind, and Which ho literal stage representation could even begin to rival” (Ellison, 1988, p. 18).
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1. Imagination and the Visual
We begin by recalling that Tolkien’s criticism of drama as 
fantasy extends beyond the incidental ineptitude of 
mechanism to the fact of its representing the fantastic 
visually:
The radical distinction between all art (including 
drama) that offers a visible presentation and true 
literature is that it imposes one visible form. Literature 
works from mind to mind and is thus more progenitive. 
It is at once more universal and more poignantly 
particular. If it speaks of bread or wine or stone or tree, 
it appeals to the whole of these things, to their ideas; 
yet each hearer will give to them a peculiar personal 
embodiment in his imagination. Should the story say 
“he ate bread”, the dramatic producer or painter can 
only show “a piece of bread” according to his taste or 
fancy, but the hearer of the story will think of bread in 
general and picture it in some form of his own. If a 
story says “he climbed a hill and saw a river in the 
valley below”, the illustrator may catch, or nearly 
catch, his own vision of such a scene; but every hearer 
of the words will have his own picture, and it will be 
made out of all the hills and rivers and dales he has ever 
seen, but specially out of The Hill, The River, The 
Valley which were for him the First embodiment of the 
word.
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 70)
In the above-quoted passage we get a glimpse of Tolkien 
the Neo-Platonist (cf. Swinfen’s remark, 1984, p. 9); but we 
also discover another important facet of his idea of 
secondary belief. We affirm here with the commentators that 
Tolkien seeks a stronger, more positive expression than 
Coleridge’s “willing suspension of disbelief;” but pace 
Parks’ view (cf. Parks, 1981) that Tolkien’s intention is to 
strengthen the voice of the narrator, what he is in fact doing 
is expanding the role of the hearer. Just as in his art the artist 
actively participates in God’s primary creative activity, so 
too in his or her hearing of the artist’s narrative the hearer 
actively participates in the act of imagination induced 
(indeed, necessitated) by its non-visual character. In 
Tolkien’s own words, such narrative makes it possible for 
artist and hearer to become “partners in making and delight” 
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 50)7.
This understanding aids us in further clarifying Tolkien’s 
definition of fantasy as an artistic mode. Rather them 
speaking of a unity in the process of creation with the 
finished, sub-creative product, we might more accurately 
speak of a collaboration between the work of the author and 
the work of the reader/hearer; for the implication of 
Tolkien’s remarks about narrative force us to view the
artistic product as unfinished until the hearer has actively 
“completed” it by way of imaginative effort. This, I believe, 
is the logic behind Tolkien’s claim that fantasy must 
“embrace both the Sub-creative Art in itself and a quality of 
strangeness and wonder in the Expression, derived from the 
Image” (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 45).
All forms of art, to use Tolkien’s vocabulary, involve the 
possession and use of the imaginative faculty, the artistic 
process itself, and the artistic product; within this schema, 
the fantastic narrative is distinguished by the particular 
character of the relationship between the author and hearer 
(or, alternately, between the two moments of artistic creation 
and reception). This can be illustrated by the following 
diagram;
“ART” “THE EXPRESSION”
(the work of the artist) (the imaginative work of the hearer)
“THE IMAGE”
(the imaginative faculty common to both artist and hearer)
The visual, then, is hostile to Tolkien’s aesthetic because it 
destroys this special relationship between author and hearer 
which is necessary for the operation of fantasy8.
2. Identity and Difference
Tolkien’s second reason for the exclusion of drama as 
fantasy -  its necessarily limited focus on the human 
condition — concerns not so much the means or operation of 
fantasy as its ultimate purpose or goal which, as we have 
already suggested, looks toward that which is other and 
transcendent to human experience. In this sense it is the 
limitations of the human condition itself which constitute a 
kind of visual presence needing to be transcended in order 
for fantasy to begin. This is the “quality of strangeness and 
wonder in the Expression, derived from the Image” of which 
Tolkien speaks -  the quality which awakens our desire and 
invites us to participate in its operations.
The claim that fantasy is not properly “about” the human 
condition raises the thorny question of its value and validity 
as a product of human imagination. Despite Tolkien’s 
assertion of its virtue (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 45), this question 
has served as a central rallying point in attacks levelled 
against the fantastic from many quarters, notably in the 
criticism of Tolkien’s own work on the part of the literary 
establishment. If fantasy were “about” nothing other than 
itself, totally unconnected with reality, then it would indeed 
be legitimate to regard it as little more than an exercise in 
depreciative fancy. But as we have already seen, Tolkien
7 In her unpublished thesis, Deirdre Greene (1989) has explored this dimension of Tolkien’s aesthetic from the very fruitful perspective of 
reception theory. Her study of Tolkien’s fictional writings provides insightful examples of how this “providential” relationship between the 
artist and the reader/hearer outlined at the philosophical level in “On Fairy-Stories” manifests itself in the very texture and event structure of 
his narrative at the literary level.
8 One of Coleridge’s motivations in insisting on the fancy-imagination distinction was the need to separate artistic genius from the 
unwashed masses, who are at best only capable of mechanical fancy (Biographia Literaria Chapter VI). Tolkien, by contrast, uses this 
distinction to unite the activity of the artist with the reader/hearer. The operation of fantasy is, indeed, impossible without the active, 
participatory role of the reader/hearer’s imaginative faculty. It is the imagination which facilitates partnership in making and delight.
views fantasy as generated by legitimate human desires. 
Fantasy remains a valid art form because, for him, those 
desires refer to or anticipate something which itself possesses 
an “underlying reality” (Tolkien, 1989a, p. 64), though a 
reality distinct from that which we now experience.
As we have seen, part of the self-referentiality of fantasy’s 
being “about” itself stems from the unity of the form and 
content necessary to its operation: its non-visual mode of 
presentation offers us images of things which are themselves 
not to be seen within the world as we know it. It now appears 
that this correlation is intentional, and that Tolkien’s 
insistence that fantasy embrace the activity of both artist and 
hearer is extended to its final goal as well as its operations. 
Tolkien expresses this view not only at the philosophical 
level, but in the content of his own creative writings. This is 
best seen in the role played by the Elves:
At the heart of many . . . stories of the elves lies, 
open or concealed, pure or alloyed, the desire for a 
living, realized sub-creative art . . .O f  this desire the 
elves, in their better (but still perilous) part, are largely 
made; and it is from them that we may learn what is the 
central desire and aspiration of human Fantasy -  even if 
the elves are, all the more in so far as they are, only a 
product of Fantasy itself.
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 50)
The central desire of fantasy, then, is that our sub-creations 
be granted primary existence -  that they become a part of 
reality. Tolkien’s Elves signify this desire because (unlike 
us) they do possess the power (in the secondary world) of 
giving primary reality to their artistic creations. The Elves 
are “about” themselves because they are only a product of 
our imagination -  once again, the forms which our 
imagination invents or “discovers” are identical or 
organically related to the content of our desires.
It would be accurate to say that, in this sense, Tolkien 
holds to an autotelic or self-generating view of fantasy 
(hence his claim for its validity), but only in the larger 
context of his Romantic belief in humanity as sub-creative -  
made, that is, “in the image and likeness of a Maker” 
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 52); for not all human desires are equally 
legitimate, and for this reason the Elves signify not only the 
identity of our desire, but the peril of difference -  that which 
we cannot and should not seek to realize in this world. 
Tolkien therefore distinguishes genuine artistic desire 
(signified by Elvish “enchantment”) from its counterfeit 
(which he calls “magic”):
Enchantment produces a Secondary World into 
which both designer and spectator can enter, to the 
satisfaction of their senses while they are inside; but in 
its purity it is artistic in desire and purpose. Magic 
produces, or pretends to produce, an alteration in the 
Primary World . . . it is not an art but a technique; its 
desire is power in this world, domination of things and 
wills.
(Tolkien, 1989a, pp. 49-50)
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Tolkien also identifies magic with “the machine” (that is, 
technology):
Unlike art which is content to create a secondary 
world in the mind, [machinery] attempts to actualize 
desire, and so to create power in this World; and that 
cannot really be done with any real satisfaction . . . 
And in addition to this fundamental disability of a 
creature, is added the Fall, which makes our devices not 
only fail of their desire but turn to new and horrible 
evil.
(Tolkien, 1981, pp. 87-88)
Another aspect of visuality for Tolkien, then, is that it can 
suggest an illicit attempt to realize desire in this world -  to 
display something visually becomes a metaphor of coercion.
It is for this reason that our desires, for Tolkien, must not 
only be expressed, but contained by the boundaries which 
separate art from the primary world9. Because the primary 
world is, for him, a fallen world, our sub-creative desire 
cannot help but be fraught with ambivalence and danger. 
Hence, the rejection of visuality constitutes one element in 
Tolkien’s larger moral resistance to the perils and 
temptations of humanity’s fallen nature. But if our desires 
are corruptible, so too they are in Tolkien’s mind 
redeemable. Indeed, if the central desire of fallen humanity is 
the realization of its imaginative creations, then just as 
central must be the desire to escape our fallen state itself.
Romantic thought had made art the analogy of divine 
creation, but it is Tolkien who brings fantasy into a unique 
relationship with salvation history. Whereas tragedy is, for 
Tolkien, the highest function of drama, eucatastrophe is the 
highest function of fantasy, which he describes as
a sudden and miraculous grace: never to be counted on 
to recur. It does not deny the existence of 
dyscatastrophe, of sorrow and failure: the possibility of 
these is necessary to the joy of deliverance; it denies (in 
the face of much evidence, if you will) universal final 
defeat and in so far is evangelium, giving a fleeting 
glimpse of Joy, Joy beyond the walls of the world, 
poignant as grief.
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 62)
“The Birth of Christ,” writes Tolkien, “is the eucatastrophe 
of Man’s history. The Resurrection is the eucatastrophe of 
the story of the Incarnation . . .  It is not difficult to 
imagine,” he continues,
the peculiar excitement and joy that one would feel, if 
any specially beautiful fairy-story were found to be 
“primarily” true, its narrative to be history, without 
thereby necessarily losing the mythical or allegorical 
significance that it had possessed. It is not difficult, for 
one is not called upon to try and conceive anything of a 
quality unknown. The joy would have exactly the same 
quality, if not the same degree, as the joy which the 
“turn” in a fairy-story gives . . .  It looks forward (or 
backward: the direction in this regard is unimportant) to 
the Great Eucatastrophe. The Christian joy, the Gloria,
H E  R O M A N T I C  T R A D I T I O N  81
9 In her important structural study of the genre, Rosemary Jackson sees the representation of desire and its containment as two principal 
strategies deployed by fantastic literature to achieve its effects (Jackson, 1988, p. 3).
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is of the same kind; but . . . this story is supreme, and 
it is true. Art has been verified.
(Tolkien, 1989a, pp. 65-66)
Tolkien’s view of the Incarnation as “verifying” art is the 
key thought in the above-quoted passage which links it to the 
theme of visuality as realisation. Unlike most Romantic 
christologies which tend to focus on Christ as the prototype 
of artistic creation alone, Tolkien focuses not on the 
mediatory aspect of the person of Christ, but on the fact of 
incarnation itself -  that desire has in fact been fulfilled in the 
primary world and, hence, becomes the prototype not of 
creation but of future fulfilment.
Unlike much Romantic thought, which came to ascribe a 
saving character to the exercise of the imagination, Tolkien 
viewed salvation as strictly the province of the evangelium 
itself. In characterising the eucatastrophe of human fantasy 
as “looking forward or backward” toward the primary 
eucatastrophe, however, he nevertheless grants it a special 
status -  not only verifying the evangelium and being verified 
by it in turn, narrative fantasy also comes to confirm our 
continued nature as sub-creators. It looks not only backward 
to the Incarnation; it looks forward to the Parousia and final 
redemption. In this latter function it becomes not so much 
the analogy to salvation, but prophetic in character. This 
moves us to the final (and in this case positive) sense which 
the visual signifies for Tolkien, which he calls “recovery.”
3. Recovery as the Redemption of the Visual
Tolkien describes recovery as the “regaining of a clear 
view”:
I do not say “seeing things as they are” and involve 
myself with the philosophers, though I might venture to 
say “seeing things as we are (or were) meant to see 
them” -  as things apart from ourselves. We need, in 
any case, to clean our windows; so that the things seen 
clearly may be freed from the drab blur of triteness or 
familiarity — from possessiveness.
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 53)
This rediscovery of difference is crucial to Tolkien’s 
defence of fantasy because it gives a rationale for its 
independent value apart from the anticipation of the 
evangelium. Like the many leaves of a single tree, each new 
story “is a unique embodiment of the pattern” (Tolkien, 
1989a, p. 52, my emphasis). “No assumptions about the 
nature of reality, even purely supematuralist or acausal 
beliefs held absolutely, release the storyteller from the task 
of making a story” (Parks, p. 147). In this respect, the 
unrealisability of human desire as signified by the non-visual 
character of fantasy refers as much to a positive aspect of our 
nature as it does to the negative consequences of the Fall -  if 
desire were absolutely satisfied, it would imply that our role 
as sub-creators was at an end. But this is surely not the case: 
“Redeemed Man,” writes Tolkien, "is still man”:
Story, fantasy, still go on, and should go on . . .So 
great is the bounty with which he has been treated that 
he may now, perhaps, fairly dare to guess that in 
Fantasy he may actually assist in the effoliation and 
multiple enrichment of creation. All tales may come 
true; and yet, at the last, redeemed, they may be as like 
and as unlike the forms that we give them as Man, 
finally redeemed, will be like and unlike the fallen that 
we know.
(Tolkien, 1989a, p. 66)
Conclusion
Two general conclusions may be drawn from this analysis of 
Tolkien’s thinking. Firstly, Tolkien’s revisions of Romantic 
thought are necessary components to his defence of literary 
fantasy as a genre in its own right. Secondly, while 
eucatastrophe remains Tolkien’s unique contribution to 
Christian Romanticism, it is his insistence upon the non­
visual character of fantasy (rather than the idea of sub- 
creation as such) which structurally links Tolkien’s 
aesthetics to his theology, and it is an appreciation of this 
link which allows us to view Tolkien’s Romanticism as an 
integral dimension to his life and work as a whole.
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